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One of the special hazards involved in mineral production is
the risk that the producer may have to account to owners
unforeseen' at the commencement of production. This is the
result when the producer extracts minerals to which he has no
claim; under these circumstances he is a trespasser in the eyes
of the law.2 The same uncertainty is present when the producer
extracts minerals in which there are additional latent ownership
interests at the time production begins; in this case the producer
becomes a cotenant with such interests .
Discovery of the extraction frequently results in a civil suit
in which the producing trespasser or joint tenant is a defendant.
4
The plea in such suits is that the producer account to the
nonconsenting owner for the minerals appropriated.'
Although it is also possible that the producer will have to account to parties
which were foreseen to him at the time his production began, an assumption for this
Note is that the producer is acting in good faith. Good faith on the part of the producer
is a requirement for the issues addressed by this Note; therefore the producer must not
foresee the possibility of accounting for his production, for this would bring into question
his good faith.
2 See, e.g., Swiss Oil Corp. v. Hupp, 69 S.W.2d 1037 (Ky. 1934).
3 See, e.g., infra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
4 The theory of damages in such cases is restitution. The owner is to be compen-
sated for his appropriated minerals, the value of the minerals being their value in place.
Johns Run Coal Co. v. Little Fork Coal Co., 3 S.W.2d 623, 624 (Ky. 1928).
' See generally id.
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When the producer has acted willfully6 a harsh rule of dam-
ages is applied. 7 This rule denies the defendant credit for any
costs incurred in producing the mineral." If the defendant acted
innocently, he may reduce the amount received for the sale of
the mineral by some of his costs of production.9
When the producer is allowed to deduct the expenses of
production, a frequently litigated issue is which of the expenses
will be allowed and which will not.'0 It is difficult, if not im-
possible, to answer this question in the absence of litigation
because the courts who have previously addressed these questions
have typically provided little or no rationale for their decisions."1
The resulting uncertainty hinders the development of valuable
mineral estates 12 and promotes the use of less desirable methods
of computing damages 3 due to an unnecessarily undeveloped
area of the law.'
4
This Note will examine the reported decisions in this area to
determine the types of expenses which have been allowed by
some courts. Although the analysis will focus on Kentucky law,
cases from other jurisdictions will be discussed for their persua-
sive value. As a general solution to the uncertainty as to whether
costs are deductible, this Note will propose that the general rule
I For an excellent discussion of the determination of when a producer has acted
wilfully or innocently see Stigger, The Mineral Trespasser: Innocent v. Willful, 12-
ANNUAL MIN. L. SEMINAR 10-B (Oct. 2-3, 1987).
7 See, e.g., Houston Production Co. v. Mecom Oil Co., 62 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1933).
Id.
Swiss Oil Corp. v. Hupp, 69 S.W.2d 1037, 1044 (Ky. 1934).
,0 See infra text accompanying notes 46-90.
" See e.g. infra text accompanying notes 86-90.
a See Smith, Methods for Facilitating the Development of Oil and Gas Lands
Burdened With Outstanding Mineral Interests, 43 TEX. L. REV. 129, 131 (1964-65).
'1 See Trustees of Proprietors of Kingston v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 88 A. 768,
769 (Pa. 1913) (adopting the "royalty method" of computing damages due to the
uncertainty of the computations of value based on the proceeds less the cost of produc-
tion); accord, Reeves, Liability for Mining on a Void Claim, 16 ROCKY MTN. MN. L.
FOUND., Vol. 6 AMEmCAN LAW OF MINNG, 2d ed. § 203.01(2)(b) at 203-07 (2d ed.
1987). The "royalty method" is criticized because it allows the defendant no less than
he would have recovered had he bargained with the owner, and because it fails to
compensate the owner for the value of his minerals in some situations. Hughett v.
Caldwell County, 230 S.W.2d 92, 95 (Ky. 1950).
" Avenues of analysis do exist in this area; see, e.g., notes 91-96 and accompanying
text.
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as to the deductibility of production costs in such cases of
trespass should be that the defendant may deduct only costs
which the plaintiff would have incurred. The amount of this
deduction should be ascertained by an examination of the plain-
tiff's costs for mining similar sites. Where this information is
unavailable, the defendant's deduction should be based on cus-
tomary costs of mining near the locality of the trespass. As an
extension of this thesis, the Note will comment on the recent
trend of the Kentucky courts and explain why this trend should
be reversed.
II. ANALYSIS OF PRIOR CASES
A. Trespassers, Cotenants and the Law
One of the most frequently cited cases in the area of the
trespassing mineral producer is the Kentucky case, Swiss Oil v.
Hupp.5 This litigation involved a producer, Hupp, who had
drilled under color of title from a defective "top lease' '16 on
land which was validly leased to another. 17 Because the plaintiff,
Swiss Oil, was a lessee, the court viewed this claim differently
from the claim of an owner. 8 Had Swiss Oil been the owner of
the land, the measure of damages would have been the custom-
ary royalty. 19 Because Swiss Oil was a lessee, the court felt that
it was entitled to the "market value less the cost of extracting
and marketing .. ."20 In so holding, the court was forced to
distinguish the situation of the oil and gas trespasser from the
coal trespasser and from situations in which the plaintiff was
the owner of the appropriated oil and gas and not merely a
'1 69 S.W.2d 1037 (1934).
16 A "top lease" is "[a] subsequent oil and gas lease which covers one or more
mineral interests that are subject to a valid, subsisting prior lease." BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY 1335 (5th ed. 1979).
69 S.W.2d at 1039.
Id. at 1043.
,9 "We regard [the royalty rule] sound, for royalty is all that . . . an owner would
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lessee. 21 In these cases, the measure of damages remained undis-
turbed as "the usual and customary royalty." 22
The holding in Swiss Oil brought to Kentucky law the ques-
tion of which expenses would be allowed to a producing tres-
passer.23 As part of its analysis, the court relied on another
Kentucky case, New Domain Oil and Gas Co. v. McKinney,
24
which had addressed the same question fourteen years earlier in
a situation involving cotenants. 25 In New Domain, the producer
had begun production and was subsequently declared to be a
cotenant of the oil and gas he was producing. 26 The court
compared the producing cotenant to the innocent trespasser,
cited a lengthy number of precedents outside Kentucky which
granted the plaintiff the "value in situ ' 2 of the converted prop-
erty, and reaffirmed the use of that method. 2 The court adopted
for the measure of the "value in situ" a method which can be
summarized as the gross proceeds less expenses of the opera-
tion. 29 It should be observed that this court's analysis was based
on a theory of restoring the plaintiff to his original position
rather than preventing the unjust enrichment of the defendant.
Therefore, the remedy was not a suit for money had and received
by the defendant, but rather was an attempt to restore the value
of the coal to the plaintiff. The measure of that value is the
proceeds less the expenses of the operation. 30
2 Id. at 1044.
22 69 S.W.2d at 1044.
2 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
221 S.W. 245 (Ky. 1920).
I' d. at 251.
Id. at 246.
27 Although the court was secure that the general rule was the "valu in situ" or
value in place basis for recovery, the court noted that there was a discrepancy in the
method which different jurisdictions used to compute the value in place. Id. at 250.
Some jurisdictions, the court noted, compute the value by deducting "from the value
of the mineral at the mouth of the mine the expense of extracting it, and the difference
is taken as its value as it lay in the earth." Id. Pennsylvania was referenced as computing
the value of the mineral as "the universal and customary royalty paid for the right of
mining the particular substance in the locality . Id.
u Id.
29 Id. at 251-52. It should be emphasized that these suits are not based on the fact
that the defendant has money to which he is not entitled; the legal theory is that the
law is seeking to restore the plaintiff for coal which he has lost. See supra note 5.
10 See supra note 29.
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The third Kentucky case to refine the measure of damages
using the "value in situ" based on the gross proceeds less cost
of production method of computing damages was the 1950 case,
Hughett v. Caldwell County.31 The Hughett court held that the
royalty methoda2 would be used when the owner "could not
extract the minerals himself in any practical or feasible way, or
where he [was] merely holding his property for development in
the unforeseable future. . .. "" This case more notably held that
when the owner is able to produce the mineral himselfP4 a
different rule would apply; the measure of damages would be
the same as those in the case of the injured lessee and the
nonproducing cotenant. This measure would be the "reasonable
market value . . . less the reasonable cost incurred .. . in min-
ing."
35
These three cases and their progeny illustrate situations in
which it will be necessary to determine the reasonable costs of
production.16 They also provide examples of costs which have
1' 230 S.W.2d 92 (Ky. 1950). This case is actually one of a series of appeals
growing out of a much litigated contest over the ownership of a roadbed containing
fluorspar. Cases related to this litigation are: Caldwell County v. Hughett, 248 S.W.2d
338 (Ky. 1952) (court analyzes the reasonableness of certain items of cost claimed
deductible by defendant); Morgan v. Hughett, 192 S.W.2d 197 (Ky. 1946) (a quitclaim
deed obtained by Hughett was found not to have been obtained by fraud); Caldwell
County v. Hughett, 192 S.W.2d 194 (Ky. 1946) (Caldwell County's motion for new trial
is denied); Hollowell v. Caldwell County, 155 S.W.2d 481 (Ky. 1941) (title to the disputed
property is adjudged to be in Hughett).
3 See supra note 27 (explanation of the "royalty method").
'3 230 S.W.2d at 96.
14 Id. at 97. See also Stigger, supra note 6, at R-18 (discussing Rudy v. Ellis, 236
S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1951) as holding a similar measure of damages to be applicable).
11 230 S.W.2d at 97. Interestingly, this case involves a plaintiff in a suit for
recovery of the value of appropriated fluorspar, a hard mineral like coal. It was coal
which Swiss Oil had explicitly held to still fall under the royalty method. Obviously, the
holding in Hughett modifies the recovery in the coal scenario when the owner is able to
produce.
16 Another case which may have an impact on the question of when this measure
of damages might be available is a Kentucky tax case: Commonwealth Dep't of Revenue
v. Majestic Collieries Co., 594 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1980). This case holds that, for purposes
of taxation, a person is "severing coal" when he owns the coal and uses a contract
miner to take the coal from the earth. Id. at 878. Arguably, anyone who owns coal is
able to mine that coal through a contract miner and, therefore, entitled to the measure
of damages of one able and intending to mine the coal. It should be remembered,
however, that the test formulated in Hughett for the royalty method was a disjunctive
test, the second prong of which focuses on the purpose for which the owner holds his
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY
been allowed. They do little, however, to provide useful rules
for determining which costs are reasonable. 37 The resulting un-
certainty provides an impediment to the development of mineral
estates in which the producer may have to account for his
production.3" This same lack of certainty has been used in Penn-
sylvania as a justification for strict application of the much
criticized royalty method of computing damages.3 9 Because of
the problems this uncertainty creates, Kentucky courts should
seize the opportunity to develop this area of the law.
Two Kentucky cases which have attempted to provide some
guidelines for the deductibility of costs have failed to focus on
the restitutionary nature of the remedy for a mineral trespass.
4
0
These two cases are Joyce v. Zachary41 and Howard v. Kingmont
Oil,42 both of which focus on the question of whether the tres-
passer thought his expenditures would be beneficial to the plain-
tiff. If the trespasser so believed thcn the expenditures of the
defendant are deductible. These cases have also focused on the
expenditures of the defendant rather than the benefit derived by
the plaintiff.43 Clearly the Kentucky courts have lost sight of the
restitutionary nature of the remedy as enunciated in Hughett v.
Caldwell County." As the Kentucky courts receive the oppor-
tunity to develop this area of the law, they should remedy the
digressions they have made from the goal of restitution. This
should be done by ignoring the question of whether costs were
"reasonably calculated to be beneficial" and by focusing on a
property. 230 S.W.2d at 96. In order to qualify out of the royalty measure of value
under the test set forth in Hughett, the plaintiff must have both ability and intent to
develop. Commonwealth Dep't of Revenue v. Majestic Collieries may reflect on ability
but it cannot reflect on intent.
37 See Smith supra note 12 at 131. See also, Reeves, Liability for Mining on a
Void Claim, 16 ROCKY MTN. MN. L. FOUND., supra note 13 § 203.01(2)(b); Schwinn,
Tort Liability Resulting from Mining Operations, 8 ROCKY MTN. MlN. L. INST. 461,
483 (1963).
38 See supra note 12.
19 See supra note 13.
, See supra notes 4, 29 and accompanying text.
41 434 S.W.2d 659 (Ky. 1968).
42 729 S.W.2d 183 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).
43 434 S.W.2d at 661; 729 S.W.2d at 183.
" See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
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restitutionary measure of damages rather than the expenditures
of the defendant.
45
B. General Principles of Deductibility
Although the reported cases provide little analysis, they do
provide examples of deductible costs. Unfortunately, there is
little uniformity among decisions; therefore, any analysis is lim-
ited to the facts of the case and the jurisdiction in which it was
decided. Because one goal of this Note is to provide guidance
as to the costs which Kentucky courts might allow, it begins by
examining reported cases from all jurisdictions for general themes
of deductibility.
1. Direct Costs of Extraction
Almost all jurisdictions allow the deduction of "direct costs"46
of extraction. 47 Although early decisions disallowed the costs
incurred in severing the mineral from the earth, 4 these cases
have since been misinterpreted as allowing the deductibility of
such expenses49 where the expenses were direct and reasonable.50
In a California case5 which allowed the direct costs of extrac-
tion, the court was careful to note that "overhead costs ... and
all other items that do not fall strictly under the classification
of 'mining and milling' should not be deducted." '5 2 The wording
of this decision suggests strict construction of the term "direct
costs." In California, the direct costs of mining and milling may
be deducted, but one should note that overhead, even variable
overhead, might not be deductible as part of the direct costs. 3
41 See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
" "Direct costs" are the costs "of direct material and labor, and variable overhead
incurred in producing a product." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 413 (5th ed. 1979).
" See, e.g., Daly v. Smith, 33 Cal. Rptr. 920, 926 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963);
McGuire v. Boyd Coal & Coke Co., 86 N.E. 174, 175 (Ill. 1908).
41 Reeves, supra note 37 at 523.
49 Id.
11 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
11 Daly v. Smith, 33 Cal. Reptr. 920 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
I1 d. at 926 (emphasis added).
11 Id. See also, Clarke-Montana Realty Co. v. Butte & Superior Copper Co., 233
F. 547, 577 (D. Mont. 1916), aff'd, 248 F. 609 (9th Cir. 1918).
1988-89]
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As with all costs, direct costs of production are limited by
the requirement that they be "reasonable. 5 4 Such a requirement
does little to provide guidance, for to label a cost as "reasona-
ble" is to first answer the question, "Is the cost deductible?"
Although no case has posited useable guidelines as to reasona-
bleness, a West Virginia case, Spruce River Coal Co. v. Valvo
Coal Co.,55 does provide an example from which important
observations can be made.
In Spruce River the producing defendant had experienced a
labor strike which had caused actual costs of production to be
inordinately high during the period the defendant was appropri-
ating the plaintiff's coal.5 6 In arriving at the cost allowable to
the defendant, the West Virginia Supreme Court upheld a jury
verdict which ignored the defendant's actual costs and based the
deduction on evidence of what it would have cost the plaintiff
to produce the coal .
7
This case is important in an analysis of "reasonableness"
for two reasons. First, it disallows increased costs due to strikes
and-arguably-other factors unique to the defendant. Sec-
ondly, it allows the reasonable cost of production to be based
on the plaintiff's costs of mining similar properties in the vicin-
ity." Therefore, this case supports the assertion that "reasona-
ble" is a ceiling based on the amount for which the plaintiff
5, Hughett v. Caldwell County, 230 S.W. 2d 92, 97 (Ky. 1950); Caldwell Countyv. Hughett, 248 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Ky. 1951).
11 120 S.E. 302 (W. Va. 1923).
16 120 S.E. at 303.
11 Id. The logic behind this decision is intuitively appealing and reconcilable with
other cases on the issue. Consider the holding in Hughett: there the court stated that
when a plaintiff is in a position to mine and intends to do so, his coal has a different
value than one who is holding his coal with no view of mining. See supra notes 31-35
and accompanying text. This same logic would support the Spruce River holding because
a plaintiff who is holding his coal for mining is damaged in the amount of any costs
which the appropriator incurs which exceed the costs the plaintiff would have experi-
enced. This same concept appears in Bates v. Smith, 54 Cal. Reptr. 624 (Cal. Ct. App.
1966), where the court noted that, "[t]he owner .. . should be entitled to the value of
the property .... This value should not be diminished by a reckless and unskillful
operation .... The measure of damages . . . is the amount that will fully compensate
the plaintiff for all the detriment proximately caused by the trespass." Id. at 626.
11 120 S.E. at 304. See also, Clark-Montana Realty Co. v. Butte & Superior Copper
Co., 233 F. 547 (D. Mont. 1916), where evidence of plaintiff's efficiency seems to have
entered into the court's decision. Id. at 577.
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could have produced the mineral but for the defendant's appro-
priation.5 9 Such a measure is also completely consistent with a
restitutionary measure of damages, for it more accurately reflects
the value of the coal to the plaintiff.
2. Overhead
Even though overhead may not be deductible as part of a
strict construction of "direct costs," 6 most jurisdictions allow
overhead to be deducted separately. 6' The majority rule allows
such deductions based on allocations rather than upon an ex-
amination of whether or not additional costs were incurred as a
result of the operations on plaintiff's property. 62 Kentucky courts
follow this latter view.6 3
3. Compensation for Services
In this category alone a distinction might be necessary be-
tween a producing trespasser and a producing cotenant. While
the producing cotenant is generally not allowed a deduction for
his services,64 a producing trespasser may be allowed such com-
pensation .61
4. Income Taxes Paid by the Defendant on Profits
From the Appropriated Minerals
This is a cost for which there seems to be a developing
general rule of nondeductibility. 66 This rule is found in cases as
19 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
Io See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
6, Greer v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 200 F.2d 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1952); Swiss
Oil v. Hupp, 69 S.W.2d 1037, 1045 (1934); Spruce River Coal Co. v. Valvco Coal Co.,
120 S.E. 302, 304 (W. Va. 1923); New Domain Oil & Gas Co. v. McKinney, 221 S.W.
245, 251 (1920).
62 Daley v. Smith, 33 Cal. Reptr. 920, 926 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Clarke-
Montana Realty Co. v. Butte & Superior Copper Co., 233 F. 547, 577 (D. Mont. 1916),
aff'd, 248 F. 609 (9th Cir. 1918).
63 69 S.W.2d at 1045.
" Wolfe v. Childs, 94 Pac. 292, 294 (Colo. 1908); Annotation, 51 A.L.R.2D, 474
(1957); Annotation, 5 A.L.R.2D, 1379 (1949).
61 Caldwell County v. Hughett, 248 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Ky. 1951).
69 S.W.2d at 1045; but see United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 21
F. Supp. 645 (S.D. Cal. 1937), aff'd, 107 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1939) (which seems to state
a general rule of deductibility for income taxes). Id. at 655.
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early as Swiss Oil, where the court correctly stated that "[income
tax can hardly be regarded as entering into the cost of produc-
tion. Its very nature repudiates the idea." '67 Another example is
United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California,68 where the
court decided that it was bound by the guidelines of a California
statute69 stating that costs were to include taxes. 70 Rather than
analyze whether "taxes" is a word intended to include income
taxes, the court justified its deduction by analogizing the case
of mineral trespass to cases involving patent infringement and
utility ratemaking cases. Some of these cases had allowed the
deduction of income taxes. 71 Quoting a patent infringement case,
the trial court stated that "allowance is made for taxes paid, in
order to leave the infringer accountable for 'only the profits of
which it actually has had the benefit.' ",72 This statement indi-
cates that the trial court had lost sight of the goal of reimbursing
the plaintiff and instead was focusing on the profits made by
the defendant. In addition to reliance on what it saw as precedent
and the terms of the statute, the court was also impressed by
the fact that the plaintiff was the United States government, the
entity to which the taxes had been originally paid. 73 This latter
fact is the one upon which the Ninth Circuit correctly upheld
the allowance. As part of the holding, the appellate court ex-
pressed its doubt as to whether income taxes were contemplated
by the statute or whether they were "generally [classified] as an
expense of production. ,
74
61 69 S.W.2d at 1045. In addition to recognizing a general rule of nondeductibility,
the court was also impressed with the fact that the defendant had already applied for a
refund.
21 F. Supp. 645 (S.D. Cal. 1937), aff'd, 107 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1939).
69 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 349 3/4 (West 1982).
70 21 F. Supp. at 655.
' Id.
12 Id. (quoting Stromberg Motor Devices Co. v. Zenith-Detroit Corporation, 73
F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1934) at 65). The court cited as authority for the general rule of
deductibility of taxes the U.S. Supreme Court case of L. P. Larson, Jr., Co. v. Wm.
Wrigley, Jr., Co., 277 U.S. 97 (1928). Interestingly, the cited case had actually denied
the deduction of taxes where the plaintiff would have to pay taxes on his recovery. Id.
at 98.
3 21 F. Supp. at 655.
' Standard Oil of California v. United States, 107 F.2d 402, 419 (9th Cir. 1939).
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5. Improvements to the Plaintiff's Land
One area in which there is some uniformity is the issue of
improvements to the plaintiff's land. Most jurisdictions allow
the defendant to deduct the cost of improvements75 but do not
allow personal judgment suits against the plaintiff.
76
More difficult questions arise when the plaintiff takes over
the improvement before it has produced enough to pay for its
cost. 77 It would be inequitable to allow the improvement to
accrue to the plaintiff's benefit but to disallow a set-off for its
cost.78 In recognition of this possible inequity, a general rule has
developed which allows the defendant to recover the costs of the
improvement from the production, if any, or to go unpaid. 79 At
least one Kentucky court has followed this common law rule.80
In addition, there is statutory protection for the good faith
trespasser.' A Kentucky statute provides that the good faith
trespasser who makes improvements is to be paid "the value of
his improvements" before the court orders him to deliver pos-
session to the plaintiff.8 2 This provides greater protection to the
defendant than the common law rule because it gives him a right
to payment rather than a mere lien on future production. A
possible limitation on this assertion is the use of the "value" of
the improvement in the statute's computation of the amount due
the trespasser. Arguably, the "value" of the improvement is so
closely tied to the resulting future production that it cannot be
accurately computed without knowing the resulting production.
Clearly such an argument must fall to the legislature's require-
" Mastin v. Mastin's Administrator, 50 S.W.2d 77, 79 (Ky. 1932); 20 AM. JUR.
2D Cotenancy and Joint Ownership § 52 (1965).
76 Mastin v. Mastin's Administrator, 243 Ky. 830, 50 S.W.2d 77, 79 (Ky. 1932);
20 AM. JUR. 2D Cotenancy and Joint Ownership § 63.
" For a discussion of the problem and its resolution see 1 E. KUNTZ, OI AND
GAS § 11.6 (1987).
1 "[Hie who seeks equity must do equity. Id. at 321.
79 Lawrence Oil Corporation v. Metcalfe, 100 S.W.2d 217, 222-23 (Ky. 1936). See
also Fox v. Buckingham, 14 S.W.2d 421 (Ky. 1928).
8 See Kuntz supra note 77 for a discussion of the general rule (citing Joyce v.
Zachary, 434 S.W.2d 659 (Ky. 1968)).
1, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.460 (Bobbs-Merrill 1972) [hereinafter KRS].
82 Id.
1988-89]
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ment that the payment be ordered before delivery of the property
to the plaintiff.83
6. Secondary Recovery Expenses
Few cases have addressed the question of whether secondary
or heroic recovery techniques are deductible. In the case of Joyce
v. Zachary84 the expenditures of water flooding and the associ-
ated engineering fees were allowed where there was evidence that
the water flooding kept production from decreasing. 85
One case which may be mistaken as adjudicating the de-
ductibility of secondary recovery techniques is Caldwell County
v. Hughett.8 6 The issue in Hughett was whether the defendant
should be allowed to deduct the amount which he was "out
' 87
in getting another company to sink a new shaft on an adjacent
tract of land, divert a stream, and keep the water pumped out
of the mine. 8 After the "payment" had been made, the payee
never actually did the work. 9 Naturally the court disallowed
these costs, but the basis for the holding was the defendant's
own imprudence rather than the fact that these expenses were
comparable to secondary recovery expendituresY°
III. ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED IN ADJUDICATING THE
DEDUCTIBILITY OF COSTS OF PRODUCTION
As the foregoing sections indicate, there are currently no
clear guidelines as to the costs that are deductible by a good
faith producer in an accounting by a mineral trespasser or a
83 Id.
, 434 S.W.2d 659 (Ky. 1968).
Id. at 661-62.
248 S.W.2d 338 (Ky. 1951). Note that this is not the previously analyzed case
of Hughett but a second appeal in which the issue before the court was the deductibility
of certain costs. See discussion at supra note 31.
87 The defendant had not made an actual expenditure here but had transferred
part of his interest in the lease which was the subject of dispute. 248 S.W.2d 339, 340.
98 Id. at 339.
89 Id..
Id. Perhaps a finding implicit in disallowing these costs was that they were of
no benefit to the plaintiff. See the discussion of the importance of a benefit to the
plaintiff at infra notes 102-10.
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producing cotenant. 9' This uncertainty has resulted in a hesitancy
to develop reserves92 and, in Pennsylvania, is used as justification
for use of the "royalty method" of computing damages. 93 In
addition, this lack of guidelines has generated notable inconsis-
tency among jurisdictions. 94 Therefore, courts should seize the
opportunity to establish thoughtful precedent and flush out this
neglected area of the law.
As the following suggestions indicate, the issues to be re-
solved for each expenditure are complex and the problem does
not lend itself to an easy rubric. 95 Instead, several questions must
be answered to resolve the one ultimate question: "Are these
expenditures for which the defendant's liability is to be re-
duced?" A discussion of each of the suggested questions fol-
lows:96
1. Has an expense actually been incurred for which the
defendant will receive no remuneration or refund?
In most cases, the answer to this question will be in the
affirmative. When the answer is in the negative, however, the
basis for the court's holding that the expense is not allowed
should be clarified. The analysis applied to the deductibility of
income taxes in Swiss Oil v. Huff 7 illustrates the importance of
this question.
In Swiss Oil the court was asked if the defendant could
deduct income taxes paid on profits from sales of the plaintiff's
mineral. 9 The court stated that "[ijncome tax can hardly be
9, See supra text accompanying notes 46-90.
11 See supra note 13.
91 See supra text accompanying note 13 for criticism of the royalty method.
9, It should be noted that one case did attempt to formulate a rule for the
deductibility of costs. In Joyce v. Zachary, 434 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Ky. 1968) the court
stated, "[W]e think the test of allowability should be whether the expenses were reason-
ably calculated to be beneficial and productive." (emphasis in original). See also Howard
v. Kingmont Oil Co., 729 S.W.2d 183 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987) (citing Joyce in ascertaining
deductible production costs).
11 The length of time in which courts have been analyzing these issues and the
failure during that time to formulate a standard lends much support to this assertion.
9 Before the presentation of the question is made, the author offers a caveat:
these questions are only important when the plaintiff has acted in good faith. In some
situations, the plaintiff's behavior will give rise to estoppel or avoidable consequences
issues. See KUNTZ, supra note 77, § 11.3 at 310.
97 69 S.W.2d 1037 (Ky. 1934).
" Id. at 1045.
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regarded as entering into the cost of production. Its very nature
repudiates the idea. Moreover, [defendants] have already filed a
claim with the government for a refund ...and . . . they have
a fair chance to recover." 99 The court disallowed the deduction
but the grounds for the disallowance are unclear. The case might
stand for the proposition that income taxes are not deductible,
or for the proposition that no expenditure is to be allowed when
it can be, or has been, recovered elsewhere.
Naturally, a defendant should not be given credit for expen-
ditures which he has not incurred, or for which he will be
compensated by one other than the plaintiff' ° (the collateral
source rule' 01 excepted). Although such situations should not
arise frequently, when they do, clearly labelling the reason for
disallowance will avoid confusion by those who study the case
as a statement of law.
2. Was the expenditure of benefit to the plaintiff or a cost
which he would have incurred had he performed the extraction
himself?
In suits of this nature "the object of the law is to compensate
the owner for his loss without unduly enriching him by giving
him the advantage of the trespasser's efforts."' 1 2 The amount
of this loss is measured by an amount which is sometimes
comparable to the plaintiff's lost profits. 103 Failing to allow the
defendant a deduction for costs which the plaintiff would have
had to pay' °4 and for expenditures which benefited the plaintiff
would not serve the law's compensatory goal. A necessary result
" Id. at 1045. In addition to the two reasons appearing here, the court also stated
that plaintiffs "will have to render a tax accounting upon the recovery. Id. This
is a third possible reason for disallowance.
' ' See Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v. Conkling Mining Co., 255 F. 740 (8th
Cir. 1919), where the costs of extending and driving a tunnel were disallowed where the
revenue from the tunnel exceeded its cost, and the tunnel's purpose was not directly
related to the ore's discovery.
,o Under the collateral source rule, if an injured person is compensated for his
injuries from a source independent of the tortfeasor, the payment should not be deducted
from money he would collect from the tortfeasor. The purpose of the rule is to prevent
the torfeasor from benefitting from payment to the plaintiff from other sources. See
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 238 (5th ed. 1979).
'o KUNTZ, supra note 77, § 11.3 at 308.
Hughett v. Caldwell County, 230 S.W.2d 92, 97.
'o St. Clair v. Cash Gold Mining & Milling Co., 47 P. 466 (Colo. App. 1896).
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of the compensatory nature of the damage computation method
used in these cases is the requirement that an expenditure must
benefit the plaintiff in order to be deductible. To state the
condition for allowability is to state a problem of proof for the
defendant: 05 the expenditure must be proven to have benefited
the plaintiff in order to justify having his recovery reduced.'
°6
Most of the normal operating costs of production will satisfy
this requirement without strained analysis. The question will
serve its greatest function in deciding harder questions such as
whether the costs of dry holes or secondary recovery techniques
are deductible. 10 7 An inquiry as to whether such cost conferred
a benefit upon the plaintiff gives the courts flexibility to make
factual determinations that such expenditures did or did not
benefit the plaintiff's interest. 10 8 For example, courts have found
such benefit in the form of increased geographic knowledge of
the area when no other benefits were proven.o9 The burden of
proof that the expenditure provided a benefit to the plaintiff
falls upon the defendant." 0 When the finding of a benefit in-
volves a strained factual analysis, the limits of deductibility are
approached.
3. Will the defendant's deduction exceed the proceeds of
production?
1O "The burden of showing that the [cost] conferred a benefit is upon the tres-
passer." KUNTZ, supra note 77, § 11.6 at 322 (citing Greer v. Stanolind Oil Co., 200
F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1952)).
1o KUNTZ, supra note 77, § 11.6 at 321-22. Cf. Joyce v. Zachary, 434 S.W.2d 659,
661 (Ky. 1968). (This case seems to only require that the defendant "reasonably calcu-
lated" the costs to be beneficial to the plaintiff's interest in the minerals.).
'° Caldwell County v. Hughett, 248 S.W.2d 338 (Ky. 1951). See supra notes 86-90
and accompanying text.
101 See 434 S.W.2d at 661-62 and 664 (water flooding and dry hole costs were
found to be beneficial). For examples of costs not found to be of benefit see Caldwell
County v. Hughett, 248 S.W.2d 338 (Ky. 1951) (discussed at supra text accompanying
notes 75-90); Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Candelaria, 403 F.2d 351 (10th
Cir. 1968); Carter Oil Co. v. McCasland, 207 F.2d 728 (10th Cir. 1953) (which held
that well which was actually producing was of no benefit when the owner already had
enough wells to produce the oil under the lease in question); Greer v. Stanolind Oil &
Gas Co., 200 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1952).
,01 Edwards v. Lachman, 567 P.2d 73, 77 (Ok. 1977).
110 See KUNTZ, supra note 77. See also, Carter Oil Co.v. McCasland, 207 F.2d 728
(10th Cir. 1953).
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An elementary principle is that the defendant can recover
nothing in excess of the production resulting from his efforts.'
A refinement of this principle, which must be decided before
damages are computed, is whether this limitation is to apply on
a "per-well basis" or "on the basis of the expenditures ... and
receipts from the entire . . . premises.' ' 12 If the "per-well basis"
method is applied, the cost of each well is recoverable only from
the production from that well;' 3 if the entire property is treated
as a unit, then the operator can deduct the expenses of his
efforts from proceeds of the entire property." 4 Williams and
Meyers, authors of an oil and gas treatise,"5 have made an
intuitively appealing argument, well based in policy, for adopting
the method which treats the entire property as a unit." 6 The
argument is based on a policy of encouraging development: by
allowing the dry hole costs as a charge on total production from
a field, a producer will not be saddled with the dry hole costs
and he will be encouraged to explore because of the reduced
risk." '7 This same policy basis would support the allowance of
secondary recovery expenditures, but it would be grounded in a
policy of encouraging production rather than exploration.
Another related issue is how this limitation will be applied
when the plaintiff takes over the property before the defendant
has recovered his costs. This question will most likely appear in
relationship to improvements which the defendant has made to
the plaintiff's property and equipment located on the property
when the plaintiff takes over."' The defendant will be allowed
to remove from the premises all that can be removed without
injury to the operation," 9 but he ordinarily has no claim to
Lawrence Oil Corp. v. Metcalfe, 100 S.W.2d 217, 222-23 (Ky. 1936).
2 H. WLLIAMS AND C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS [hereinafter On. AND GAS LAW]




16 Id. Note that such a finding is a prerequisite to allowing dry-hole costs. Therefore
any case which allows dry-hole costs has adopted the entire property method of applying
the limitation. Id.
I1 Id.
"' See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
1,9 Gillespie v. Fulton Oil & Gas Co., 288 N.E. 192, 193-94 (I11. 1909); 58 C.J.S.
Mines & Minerals § 222 at 598 (1948).
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future production. 12 0 In order to receive payment for unrecovered
costs and equipment not removed, the producer must base his
recovery on a theory of property improvement. 121 The measure
of this recovery will be based on improvement to the property-
not cost to the producer.
122
4. Are the benefits to the plaintiff of such a nature that cost
to the defendant is not a valid measure of the reasonable cost
of production?
"Compensation is always the aim of the law. It is 'the
bottom principle of the law of damages. To restore the party
injured . . . to his former position is the purpose of allowing a
money equivalent of his property .... ' "123 Since the emphasis
is on compensation, it is possible that the defendant's costs may
not be a proper basis for computing the amount upon which to
base his credit.124 This possibility is best illustrated by example:
Whiteacre and Blackacre are two tracts of land of equal size
and share a common border. Oilman is the owner of Blackacre
and good faith trespasser to Whiteacre who builds a road on
the common border of the two tracts so that half of the road
is on each tract. Whiteacre and Blackacre produce equal
amounts of oil because of Oilman's efforts and his use of the
road. The road benefits both fields equally.
A hypothetical court which finds that the owner of Whiteacre
is entitled to the value of the oil less the "reasonable cost" of
production and that "reasonable cost" is always based on actual
cost is presented with a problem. If the court allows Oilman
credit for the entire cost of the road, he is benefited by virtue
of his cost-free use of the road in securing production from
Blackacre; if the court denies credit to Oilman for the cost of
the road, then the owner of Whiteacre will receive the value of
Kuntz, supra note 77, § 11.6 at 323.
, Id. at 322.
Id. at 321. See also Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Candelaria, 403
F.2d 351, 356 (10th Cir. 1968); Greer v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 200 F.2d 920, 923
(10th Cir. 1952).
In Hughett v. Caldwell County, 230 S.W.2d 92, 96 (Ky. 1950).
124 Courts have the flexibility to ignore the defendant's costs. The court "[is] not
dealing . . . with strict legal rights but with equitable principles." Joyce v. Zachary, 434
S.W.2d 659, 661 (Ky. 1968).
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the oil without having shared the cost of production attributable
to the road. Clearly, a tool is needed to temper the results of
either alternative. This tool is found in the requirement that the
limitation on the recovery is the amount by which the plaintiff
benefited-not the amount of the cost to the trespasser. 125 Ap-
plying this to our example, the amount by which the plaintiff
benefits from the road's presence is the amount by which the
road improves his property plus the value of the use of the
portion of the road which lies upon Blackacre.
This is an area in which the Kentucky courts have digressed
from the compensatory nature of the law.126 In Joyce v. Zachary,
the court stated that "the test of allowability should be whether
the expenses were reasonably calculated to be beneficial and
productive.' ' 127 This test seems to have lost focus of the limita-
tion that the cost be of benefit to the plaintiff. It is a test which
focuses on the subjective perception of the trespassing defendant
rather than the objective benefit to the plantiff. Under this test,
it appears that if the defendant reasonably believed that an
expenditure was proper, then it is allowed regardless of whether
there was actual benefit to the plaintiff. Clearly this is not in
line with a remedy based in restitution. A further deviation from
the compensatory aim results from the language of Howard v.
Kingmont Oil Co. 28 In Howard, the court stated that the defen-
dant "should be allowed to deduct its . . . costs . . . reasonably
expended" (emphasis added). 29 This test seems to focus entirely
on the expenditure, but the court provided itself with room for
salvation by stating that "Isluch costs may be allowed or disal-
lowed according to principles of fairness and equity under the
circumstances. ''
3 0
In a situation where the total benefit to the plaintiff and
defendant exceeds the cost of the improvements, unjust enrich-
' Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Candelaria, 403 F.2d 351, 356 (10th
Cir. 1968); Greer v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 200 F.2d 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1952); cf.
Joyce, 434 S.W.2d at 661, wherein the court stated that "the test of allowability should
be whether the expenses were reasonably calculated to be beneficial and productive."
See supra notes 5 and 29.
27 434 S.W.2d at 661.
729 S.W.2d 183 (Ky. 1987).
Id. at 187.
I3 d. citing 434 S.W.2d at 661.
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ment would limit the amount of the defendant's recovery to the
proportionate cost of the plaintiff's benefits. 3' This is illustrated
by reference to the example, with the additional fact that the
value of the road to the plaintiff and defendant exceeds the cost.
To allow the defendant credit for the value of the improvement
to the plaintiff which exceeds the proportionate cost of the
plaintiff's benefits from the road is to enrich the defendant by
the excess amount. This enrichment results because the defen-
dant's negligence has placed him in a position in which he can
foist upon the plaintiff the majority of the cost of an item in
which he equally shared the benefit.
5. Could the plaintiff have produced the mineral at a lower
cost?
Arguably, this question is a continuation of the "benefit to
the plaintiff" analysis of the previous section. 3 2 This question
is nonetheless important for two reasons: first, it is a concep-
tually easier theory of analysis than a purely theoretical "benefit
to the plaintiff" analysis;'33 and, second, it is an analysis which
provides a more tangible base of proof than does a "benefit to
the plaintiff" analysis.
134
This can be illustrated by returning to the previous example
and adding additional facts. In addition to the facts of the
original example, assume that the defendant built the road at a
cost of $10,000 and that the plaintiff, an expert road builder
and mineral producer, proves he could have completed the road
at a cost of $5,000. If we allow the defendant a set-off based
on his $10,000 cost we have rewarded him for his own ineffi-
ciency while failing to compensate the plaintiff for the lost value
13 KuNrz, supra note 77, at 319. See, e.g., Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v.
Conkling Mining Co., 255 F. 740 (8th Cir. 1919).
112 If the plaintiff can do for 75¢ what the defendant has accomplished for $1.00
then the amount by which the plaintiff has benfited is only the 75¢ he would otherwise
had to expend, not the $1.00 that the defendant spent.
"I Clearly, it is easier to conceptualize a comparision of the cost for which the
plaintiff could have accomplished a task than to speculate as to the amount of benefit
he derived from its performance.
'1' The "benefit to the plaintiff" analysis would most likely involve historical
financial data; the "lower cost" analysis would involve expert testimony based on
estimates.
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of his oil. 35 If, however, we treat the benefit to the plaintiff as
the amount which he now does not have to spend because of
the defendant's efforts, we have forced the defendant to bear
the costs of his own inefficiency and compensated the plaintiff
by the amount which the appropriated mineral represented to
him. 116 In situations where the Kentucky statute'3 7 is being ap-
plied, the plaintiff would argue that the value of the road to
him is no more than the amount for which he could have built
it on his own. 38
6. If the defendant is allowed the deduction, will the plain-
tiff's interest in the mineral be reduced twice?
The need for this analysis is illustrated by hypothesizing a
case in which income taxes are allowed as a deduction:
Oilman is a trespasser to Whiteacre and produces oil therefrom
which he sells for $1,000. Oilman has a tax rate of fifty percent
and the owner of Whiteacre has a tax rate of twenty-five
percent. The statute of limitations for a suit for a tax refund
has run before the owner sues Oilman.
The first problem with allowing Oilman to deduct his taxes
from the sale proceeds is that this would saddle the owner of
Whiteacre with Oilman's higher tax rate and deny him the ben-
efit of his own lower rate. This is not the main problem with
allowing the deduction. The greater problem is that the owner
of Whiteacre will have paid two levels of tax in a situation
where, without the defendant's appropriation, he would have
paid one. Here the owner would recover $500 from Oilman if
Oilman is allowed to deduct the taxes he paid. The owner would
pay his own tax of $125 upon this amount leaving him with
$375. Had the appropriation not occurred, he could have sold
The Kentucky case law discussed at supra notes 124-128 might allow this result
if $10,000 was an amount which the defendant reasonably believed would be beneficial
and productive.
16 Hughett v. Caldwell County, 230 S.W.2d 92 (Ky. 1950); Spruce River Coal Co.
v. Valco Coal, 120 S.E. 302 (W. Va. 1923).
KRS § 381.460 (Bobbs-Merrill 1972).
"' See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
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the oil for $1,000 and paid taxes of $250, leaving him with
$750. 139
Arguably, we have a good-faith defendant who has paid
$500 for which he has received nothing, but "[tihe suit is for
compensation to plaintiff, not to defendant. . . ."140 From this
one may conclude that any cost which the plaintiff must dupli-
cate or would not have incurred should not be allowed as a
deduction unless an improvement theory supports its allowance.
7. Will the defendant profit from his activities?
In order to answer the question of whether the defendant
will be allowed to retain any profits made on the converted
minerals after the plaintiff has been compensated, two competing
policy goals should be reconciled. The two goals are: (1) a policy
of discouraging trespass which would deny all profits to the
defendant; and, (2) a policy of encouraging development which
would allow the defendant to retain his profits.'
4'
Many cases herein analyzed have favored the plaintiff's po-
sition by disallowing costs of overhead, 142 construing dry hole
expenditures as falling entirely on the defendant,143 using the
potential for defendant's profit as a reason for rejecting the
royalty method,' 44 or simply stating that the defendant is not to
be allowed a profit from his trespass.
45
Arguably, cases which deny the defendant his profit after he
has compensated the plaintiff for his losses are based on a policy
of discouraging trespass to land. What these cases fail to rec-
ognize is that such a deterrent already exists in the measure of
bad faith trespass to mineral lands.'" In the case of a bad faith
,19 There is one situation where taxes are deductible. That is the situation in which
the taxing authority to whom the taxes were paid is the plaintiff owner. See United
States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 21 F. Supp. 645, 655-56 (S.D. Cal. 1937),
aff'd, 107 F.2d 403, 419 (9th Cir. 1939).
1 Clark-Montana Realty Co. v. Butte & Superior Copper Co., 233 F. 547, 577
(D. Mont. 1916).
1' See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
141 Daly v. Smith, 33 Cal. Reptr. 920 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Clarke-Montana
Realty Co. v. Butte & Superior Copper Co., 233 F.547, 577 (D. Mont. 1916), aff'd, 248
F. 609 (9th Cir. 1918).
Greer v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Company, 200 F. 2d 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1952).
Dinwiddie Construction Co. v. Campbell, 406 P.2d 294, 298 (Nev. 1965).
141 Swiss Oil Corp. v. Hupp, 69 S.W.2d 1037, 1039 (Ky. 1934) (referring to Boleman
Mortuary Association v. Fairchild, 68 S.W.2d 756 (Ky. 1934)).
1, 69 S.W.2d at 1039.
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trespasser, no deductions are allowed; the plaintiff recovers the
entire proceeds from the appropriated minerals. 147 Additionally,
the burden is on the defendant to establish his good faith once
a trespass is proven. 48 These protections clearly discourage tres-
pass. Since this discouragement of willful trespass is in place,
the law need not punish the innocent trespasser by stripping him
of the profits which he made as a result of his own efficiencies.
Since the punitive damages against the willful trespasser serve to
discourage willful trespass, the needed deterrents are already in
place; denying profits to those who develop mineral lands in
good faith will only discourage development.
Mineral producers can be guaranteed clear title in relatively
few situations. 49 Placing them at risk not only for a compen-
satory measure of damages but also for any profits they may
make will clearly deter development. Because of the desirability
of encouraging the development of mineral estates, innocent
trespassers who make a profit after paying compensation to the
owner of the appropriated minerals should be allowed to retain
those profits. This is consistent with a restitutionary measure of
damages, for once the plaintiff has received the value of his
minerals, he can ask for no more.
SUMMARY
Although the measure of damages in the mineral trespass
scenario is often stated, it is rarely applied analytically. Because
of the lack of analysis in prior decisions, confusion exists as to
which costs are deductible by a good faith mineral trespasser.
This uncertainty is a hindrance to mineral development and a
source of confusion in the law. Because of this confusion, courts
should pay special attention to the analysis given in mineral
trespass damage cases. The focus of the analysis should be
computing damages to compensate the owner without enriching
him at the expense of the defendant. In such an analysis, the
measure of the expenses allowed to the defendant should be
147 Id.
141 Kentucky Harlan Coal Co. v. Harlan Gas Coal Co., 53 S.W.2d 538, 542 (Ky.
1932).
'49 Stigger, supra note 6, at R-20.
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based on the objective benefit conferred on the plaintiff, not the
subjective perception of the defendant. If the measure of dam-
ages leaves the defendant with a profit, it should be allowed to
him since his economy gave rise to the profit.
GARY W. NAPIER

